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THE CONSULTATION CLAUSE OF THE
1973 WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
Laurence D. Pierce*
INTRODUCTION

In 1973, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution.' The
purpose of the Resolution was "to fulfill the intent of the framers of
the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective
judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indi2 Section 3 of the War Powers
cated by the circumstances ....
Resolution, the consultation clause, provides:
The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress
before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and after each such introduction
shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed
Forces are no longer3 engaged in hostilities or have been removed
from such situations.
Prior consultation pursuant to section 3 is the first of three major
components of the War Powers Resolution. Section 4 requires that
within forty-eight hours after armed forces are introduced, the President must report in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate. The report must
set forth the constitutional and legislative authority under which the
introduction took place, and the estimated scope and duration of the
hostilities. 4 Submission of the section 4 report triggers the Resolution's third component. Within sixty days of the report the President
shall terminate the use of armed forces unless Congress specifically
authorizes a longer military involvement by declaration of war or
Antioch School of Law, J.D. 1981; Harvard College, B.A. 1976.
Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). Like a bill, a joint resolution has the force of law
if approved by both Houses of Congress and the President. Today there is little practical
difference between the two, and they are often used interchangeably. This legislation was
*

"entitled a resolution instead of an act in deference to the original House version which was
designed to 'elaborate' on the war powers rather than give an 'itemized definition' of them."
King & Levens, Curbing the Dog of War: The War Powers Resolution, 18 Harv. Int'l L. J. 55,

76, n.94 (1977).
War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
SId. § 3.
4 Id. § 4(a).
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otherwise. 5 This sixty-day period may be extended an additional
thirty days if the President certifies to the Congress that an "unavoidable military necessity" 6 requires the continued use of armed forces.
The final paragraph of section 5 reserves for Congress the right to
terminate the use of Armed Forces any time before or after expiration
7
of the sixty-day period by passing a concurrent resolution.
The President has submitted war-powers reports pursuant to
section 4 on five occasions. The first three of these reports came during
April and May of 1975 following President Ford's use of troops to
evacuate United States nationals and refugees from Southeast Asia. 8
The fourth war-powers report was filed May 15, 1975 after President
Ford ordered military forces to retake the S.S. Mayaguez which had
been seized by Cambodian naval boats in international waters., Most
recently, on April 26, 1980, President Carter submitted a war-powers
report after using armed forces in an attempt to rescue American
hostages held captive in Iran.
Part I of this comment examines the legislative evolution of the
consultation clause to ascertain the intent of those congressional members who drafted and ratified the War Powers Resolution. Part II
distinguishes war-powers consultation and "briefing." Part III examines the potential for realizing this congressional intent, given the
limitations inherent in congressionally mandated consultation together with the particular limitations imposed by the language of this
provision. Parts IV and V respectively examine the gap between the
congressional intent and practical effect of the War Powers Resolution, and the specific changes that could be made to ensure greater
compliance with the consultation clause. The conclusion is that the
imprecision of section 3 permits the President to make most deployId. § 5(b).

6Id.
IId. § 5c. A concurrent resolution may be passed by a simple majority vote of both the
House and Senate. Because it becomes law without the President's signature, the concurrent
resolution has also been called a "congressional veto." The constitutionality of this provision of
the the War Powers Resolution has been challenged as a violation of the "presentation clause" of
article 1, section 7 "which envisions only one way to make laws: by an affirmative vote of a
majority of Congress followed by the assent of the President, or by two-thirds of each chamber
overriding his veto." T. Frank & E. Weisband, Foreign Policy By Congress 76 (1979).
8 On April 4, 1975 naval vessels, helicopters and marines were sent to assist in the evacuation of refugees and United States nationals from Danang and other seaports in South Vietnam.
On April 12, 1975, President Ford ordered military forces to proceed with the evacuation of
United States nationals from Phnom Penh. On April 30, 1975, the President sent marines to
evacuate United States nationals and South Vietnamese from the United States Embassy in
Saigon.
I For a further discussion of the first four incidents to trigger provisions of the War Powers
Resolution, see P. Holt, The War Powers Resolution, The Role of Congress in U.S. Armed
Intervention, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. 1-2
(1978).
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ments of United States Armed Forces without observing the prior
consultation requirement.
I. THE

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

During the late 1960s, as the United States military involvement
in Southeast Asia escalated, there was a growing sense shared by
Congress and the public, that the President, through the use of the
undeclared war,' 0 had illegally assumed complete war making power.
Under articles I and II of the Constitution the war making authority
was to have been, at least to some extent, a shared executive-legislative responsibility.'
Accordingly, on June 25, 1969, the Senate
passed the National Commitments Resolution, 12 a non-binding simple
resolution,' 3 which asked the President to reconsider the use of United
States troops in Vietnam without express congressional authorization.
This was the first in a series of legislation aimed at recapturing some
of Congress' lost war making power.14 On November 16, 1970, the
House passed H.R.J. Res. 1355,15 a war-powers measure requiring the
President to consult with Congress "whenever feasible" before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities. No action was
taken by the Senate on this resolution, and it died at the end of the
91st Congress. In August of 1971, the House passed H.R.J. Res. 1,16 a
10As

early as 1800 Presidents began using their authority as Commander-in-Chief under

article II, section 2 to involve the Country in undeclared wars. This unilateral exercise of war
making power resulted in the gradual diminition in practical importance of Congress' authority
under article I, section 8 to declare war. See T. Frank & E. Weisband, supra note 7, at 63.
11 The constitutional allocation of war making authority to Congress under article 1, section
8, and to the President under article II, section 2 has generated substantial debate and will not
be reexamined here. These issues have been exhaustively, though inconclusively, treated in the
following: King & Levens, supra note 1, at 56; Frank, After the Fall: The New Procedural
Framework for Congressional Control Over the War Power, 71 Am. J. Int'l L. 605 (1977):
Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 L. &
Contemp. Prob. 12 (1976); Kelley, The ConstitutionalImplications of the Mayaguez Incident. 3
Hastings L.Q. 301 (1976); Beston, Separationof Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: Tile
OriginalIntent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 529 (1974): L.
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (1972).
12 S. Res. 85, S. Rep. No. 129, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
13 A simple resolution deals with matters entirely within the prerogatives of either the House
or the Senate. It requires neither passage by the other body nor approval by the President, and
does not have the force of law.
14 For a thorough discussion of the predecessor legislation see T. Frank & E. Weisband,
supra note 7 at 67. Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or
Surrender, 16 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 823, 824 (1975); Jenkins, The War Powers Resolution:
Statutory Limitation on the Commander-In-Chief, 11 Harv. J. Legis. 181, 185 (1974): Spong.
Can Balance be Restored in the ConstitutionalWar Powersof the President and the Congress?, 6
U. Rich. L. Rev. 1 (1971).
15 H.R.J. Res. 1355, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
16 H.R.J. Res. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1: 125

similar joint resolution, but without the phrase "whenever feasible."
After the Senate passed S. 2956,17 on April 17, 1972, the House again
passed H.R.J. Res. 1, as a substitute for the Senate bill. Conferees
were appointed, but no agreement was reached, and the legislation
died at the end of the 92d Congress.
The allocation of war making authority was raised again in the
93d Congress. On July 23, 1973, the Senate passed S. 440. 8 This bill,
introduced by Senator Javits together with fifty-two co-sponsors, was
identical to S. 2956 which had been introduced the previous session.
S. 440 did not include an explicit consultation requirement. The
report, issued by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 440, however, did speak of "renewing close consultation" 9 between the executive and legislative branches. The committee
believed that executive-congressional consultations would inevitably
result from the President's obligation under the bill to make Congress
20
a partner in shaping foreign policy.
Meanwhile on July 19, 1973, the House had passed its version of
the War Powers Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 542, section 2 of which
provided:
The President in every possible instance shall consult with the
leadership and appropriate committees of the Congress before committing United States Armed Forces to hostilities or to situations
where hostilities may by imminent and after every such commitment shall consult regularly with such Members and committees
until such United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in
hostilities or have been removed from areas where hostilities may
2
be imminent. '
The report accompanying H.R.J. Res. 542 prepared by the Committee on Foreign Affairs explicitly distinguished "consulting" from simply "informing" the Congress, by explaining that:
consultation in this provision means that a decision is pending on a
problem and that members of Congress are being asked by the
President for their advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of action contemplated. Furthermore, for
consultation to be meaningful, the President himself must participate and all information relevant to the situation must be made
available. 22
17 S. 2956, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972).
18 S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).

19 S. Rep. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1973).
20

Id.

H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1973).
22 H.R. Rep. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1973).
21
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A conference on H.R.J. Res. 542 was requested by the House July 31,
1973, and a report filed October 4, 1973.23 The final war-powers
measure as it emerged from conference embodied elements of both S.
440 and H.R.J. Res. 542. As a whole, however, the final text more
closely resembled the original House version.
That part of the joint explanatory statement of the conference
committee, dealing with the consultation clause, 24 shed little light on
the intended meaning of the consultation requirement. The intent of
the joint conferees, however, can be gleaned from congressional debate prior to the vote on the measure.
On October 10, 1973, Senator Javits, the individual credited
with principal authorship of the War Powers Resolution, explained to
his Senate colleagues:
Section 3, the provisions establishing a statutory requirement of
advance consultation as well as continuing consultation with the
Congress, is to be read as maximal rather than minimal. The
consultation requirement is not discretionary for the President; he
is obliged by law to consult before the introduction of forces into
hostilities and to continue consultations so long as the troops are
25
engaged.

During the same debate Senator Stennis stated:
The legislation includes provisions urging consultation between the
President and the Congress before U.S. Forces are introduced into
hostilities, or situations where hostilities appear imminent. This is a
particularly important provision because it emphasizes that it is
only as a result of both of these branches of the Federal Government working together and accepting26 their responsibilities that the
nation should be committed to war.

On the House side, Respresentative O'Neill said, "[The War Powers
Resolution] neither takes away nor increases the President's constitutional authority to deal with overseas crises. It simply provides that
when the President acts, he must consult with the Congress and seek
its concurrence before committing our country to war. That is the
basic fact of this legislation." '2 7 Also with respect to the consultation
clause, Representative Cleveland said, "[The] war-powers legislation
should foster a greater amount of consultation between the Executive
23 H.R. Rep. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
24

Id. at

8.

25 119 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973).
20

119 Cong. Rec. 33560 (1973).

27 119 Cong. Rec. 36212 (1973).
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and Congress well in advance 2of8 the emergence of crises in which this
resolution would have effect."

While the consultation clause of the original House bill was left
substantially intact by the conferees, "committing" and "committed,"
which appear in the earlier version, were changed to "introducing"
and "introduction.1 29 This change suggests less congressional
involvement in the decision making process, implicitly mandating
consultation only before the actual physical movement of troops into
hostilities. While the House version required consultation before committing forces to situations where hostilities "may be imminent," the
conferees instead adopted language requiring consultation only where
an imminent involvement in hostilities "is clearly indicated. "30 This
change apparently limits the range of situations where the President is
bound to consult. The requirement that the President consult with
"Congress" instead of with the "leadership and appropriate committees,"' 31 as required under the House version, makes that clause less
specific as to who the President should consult. Despite these changes,
the intent that the President engage in some form of meaningful,
non-discretionary consultation before deploying armed forces remains
clear and in accord with the original House and Senate versions.
The conference report was adopted by the Senate on October 10,
1973, and by the House on October 12. On October 25, President
Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution calling it unconstitutional
and a danger to foreign policy. 32

On November 7, at a time of

widespread anti-war sentiment, 33 the House, by a four-vote margin,
overrode the President's veto of H.R.J. Res. 542. 34 Following similar

28 119 Cong. Rec. 33872 (1973).

29Section 2 of H.R.J. Res. 542 required that "[t]he President . ..shall consult .. .before
committing United States Armed Forces . . .and after every such commitment shall consult
regularly .... " (Emphasis added.) See note 21 supra and accompanying text. Under section 3
of the War Powers Resolution "[t]he President shall consult ... before introducing United
(EmStates Armed Forces .. .and after each such introduction shall consult regularly .
phasis added.) See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
30 Section 2 of H.R.J. Res. 542 required that "[t]he President . . .shall consult . . .before
committing United States Armed Forces . . .where hostilities may be imminent .... " (Emphasis added.) See note 21 supra and accompanying text. Under section 3 of the War Powers
Resolution "[t]he President ... shall consult before introducing United States Armed
Forces . . .where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circum...
(Emphasis added.) See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
stances.
31 See notes 3 and 21 supra and accompanying text.
32 H.R. Doc. No. 171, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). For a discussion of the constitutionality of
the War Powers Resolution, see material cited note 11 supra.
33 The existing public disapproval of our involvement in Vietnam had been further heightened by the secret bombings of Cambodia during May of 1970.
34 119 Cong. Rec. 36221 (1973).
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action in the Senate, 35 the measure became Public Law Number
93-148.36
II.

WAR-POWERS CONSULTATION AND "BRIEFING" DISTINGUISHED

Under article II, section 2 of the Constitution, the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. On the basis of that
authority, the President assumes exclusive control over the instruments of military action; the President alone is empowered to mobilize United States troops. 37 To assist in the exercise of this military
power, the President receives from intelligence sources the most detailed and sensitive information concerning the international situations which might lead to the use of military force. By comparison,
Congress, cast in the role of the war-powers consultant, is generally
less informed. With the power to act, and superior intelligence information, the President lacks incentive to engage in prior, meaningful
consultation. As a result, war-powers consultation has often been
reduced to "briefing." The distinction is significant; "consultation" is
a formal deliberation involving a balanced exchange of opinion.
"Briefing," on the other hand, is merely a one-sided notification,
which in terms of the exercise of the war powers, means disclosure of
intelligence information to which the President alone is privy.
Without the power to deploy troops, and in most instances without the intelligence information necessary to make fully informed
decisions of a military nature, Congress' capacity for involvement in
war-powers decision making is limited. Nevertheless, war-powers
consultation need not be reduced to "briefing." Despite the lack of
power and information, meaningful consultation is possible. Even
where the President is simply informing members of Congress of
contemplated military action, if the discussions occur before the initiation of the military action, at least those members would have an
opportunity to communicate approving or dissenting views to the
President. Even without equal intelligence information, congressional
members can provide non-expert opinion representing actual or anticipated constituent sentiment.
35 119 Cong. Rec. 36198 (1973).
"8 War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
'7 As Commander-in-Chief the President has exclusive power to act. Whether the President
has the "authority" under the War Powers Resolution to match the exclusive power is arguable.
Section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution seems to authorize the exercise of the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief only pursuant to, "(1)[a] declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces." For a discussion of whether section 2(c) should be
considered a statement of policy or a statutory limitation on the President's use of force, see
Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or Surrender, supra
note 14, at 837; Jenkins, supra note 14, at 188.
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III. ENFORCING WAR-PowERs CONSULTATION
The War Powers Resolution is silent as to explicit sanctions
against a President who fails to comply with the consultation requirements of section 3. Although not a direct sanction, where the President wishes to continue the use of armed forces beyond the limits
prescribed by the resolution, congressional authorization is required. 38 Seemingly, Congress had hoped that the possibility of withholding this authorization, together with the political pressure
brought to bear on a President acting in clear violation of an explicit
provision of law, would be sufficient to ensure compliance. To date,
in situations where military action has not been preceded by consultation as required by the Resolution, disregard for section 3 has not
aroused enough public opposition to create a climate which would
encourage Congress to oppose the President's actions.
The ways of compelling the President to engage in the consultation required by the War Powers Resolution are at best ineffective.
For example, Congress might impose economic sanctions, but as Senator Javits observed, such sanctions are "clumsy, blunt and obsolescent. " 3 Furthermore, a suit brought to challenge the constitutionality of all or part of the War Powers Resolution may be barred by the
political question doctrine. 40° Congress has held oversight hearings in
an effort to assess and improve compliance with the consultation
provisions of the Resolution, 4' but these hearings have been investigative in nature rather than punitive, and of limited enforcement value.
38 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.

39 119 Cong. Rec. 1395 (1973). But see, Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers Resolution:
The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1975) (Congress can effectively limit
presidential war making power by means of its exclusive power over the purse). For an analysis
of other possible means of enforcing the consultation clause see Zultz, Recapture of the S.S.
Mayaguez: Failure of the Consultation Clause of the War Powers Resolution, 8 Int'l. L. & Pol.
457, 472 (1976).
40 As yet, no such challenge has been made to the constitutionality of the War Powers
Resolution. While the United States Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that any
issue involving foreign affairs would be immune from judicial review, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 211 (1962), most courts held that suits challenging the legality of the Vietnam conflict to be
nonjusticiable. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C.Cir. 1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger,
484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); DeCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146
(2d Cir. 1973); Luflig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945
(1967); Allee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.Pa. 1972), affd 411 U.S. 911 (1973); Gravel v.
Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972). But see Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d. 26 (1st Cir.
1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970). For a detailed discussion of judicial review of
executive war-making see Firmage, The War Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49
Colo. L. Rev. 65 (1977).
" See Congressional Oversight of War Powers Compliance: Zaire Airlift: Hearings before
the Subcomm. on InternationalSecurity and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); War Powers Resolution: Hearings Before Comm.
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There is a basic two-part problem with enforcing any warpowers consultation. First, Congress will probably not be aware of
any non-compliance until there has been a violation. Accordingly,
42
enforcement can only exist in the form of a reprimand after-the-fact.
Second, because any critical post hoc response might be considered
unpatriotic,there will be a tendency on the part of Congress and the
public to support the President's decision to use military force even
where the action patently violates the consultation requirements of
43
the War Powers Resolution.
President Ford's use of military force to recapture the S.S. Mayaguez illustrates these enforcement problems. 44 According to the
chronology of events prepared by the Department of State, 45 on May
12, 1975, at 5:02 a.m., 46 the United States Embassy in Jakarta informed Washington and the President that the Mayaguez had been
seized. At 7:30 a.m. a reconnaissance aircraft was sent by the Pentagon to find the ship. At 1:50 p.m. the White House conducted a press
briefing and issued a statement concerning the incident, and the next
morning, May 13, at 6:54 a.m. another press briefing was held regarding the ship's location. That afternoon, for the first time, the
congressional leadership was contacted by telephone and advised that
the President had directed military actions to prevent the Mayaguez
and its crew from being transferred to the Cambodian mainland. Less
than half an hour later, at 7:04 p.m., the first shots were fired by
United States Air Force planes at Cambodian patrol boats. The next
day, May 14, between 4:45 p.m. and 5:10 p.m., orders were issued by
the President to begin military operations to recover the Mayaguez
and its crew. Between 6:40 p.m. and 7:40 p.m. the President met
with congressional leaders to inform them of action he had taken to
recover the ship. At 9:33 p.m. the Mayaguez was recaptured and by
11:07 p.m. the crew was aboard the U.S.S. Wilson. On May 15, in
on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong. (1977) (hereinafter cited as War Powers Resolution: Hearings);
War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom
Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident: Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on
International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on InternationalRelations,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (hereinafter cited as War Powers: A Test of Compliance).
41 For a discussion of what has been called the fait accompli problem see King & Levens,
supra note 1, at 88; Jenkins, supra note 14, at 201.
4' See Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 Harv.
L. Rev. 1771, 1796 (1968).
44 This was the fourth international incident to trigger provisions of the War Powers Resolution. See notes 8 and 9 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the first three incidents.
For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of the War Powers Resolution during the Mayaguez
incident see Kelley, supra note 11, at 314.
41 War Powers: A Test of Compliance, supra note 41, at 109-11.
41 Hours given in eastern daylight time.
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accordance with section 4 of the War Powers Resolution, the President submitted a report to the Speaker of the House and President pro
tempore of the Sentate stating, "In view of this illegal and dangerous
act, I ordered, as you have been previously advised, United States
military forces to conduct the necessary reconnaissance. . . to secure
the return of the vessel and its personnel . . . ,,47 (Emphasis added.)
While most congressional members publicly approved the President's handling of the incident, they denied the suggestion that they
had been "previously advised" let alone consulted as required by the
War Powers Resolution. Then Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield said, "I was not consulted. I was notified after the fact about
what the Administration had already decided to do."148 Senator
Javits, testifying less than one month later, on June 4, 1975, before the
House Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs
stated, "Consultation with the Congress prior to the Mayaguez incident resembled the old discredited practice of informing selected
members of Congress a few hours in advance of the implementation of
decisions already taken within the executive branch." 49 During the
same hearings, Mr. Monroe Leigh, legal advisor to the Department of
State, admitted that United States aircraft had been ordered into
combat by the President before he had contacted the congressional
leadership, let alone engaged in the required consultations. 50 Despite
this self-admitted violation of the consultation requirement of the
War Powers Resolution, President Ford suffered no adverse public
reaction. In fact, throughout the country, the response to the President's action was overwhelmingly favorable. Letters, wires, and
41 Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, The War Powers Resolution, Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports
45 (1976).
48 N.Y. Times, May 15, 1975,
at 18.
War Powers: A Test of Compliance, supra note 41, at 61.
so During the oversight hearings held on June 4, 1975, the following discussion occurred:
Mr. Zablocki. Let me restate my question, and now I am going to try to make it very
pointed. On page 3 you state that the congressional leadership was informed of the
principal military operations prior to the actual commencement of those operations.
I presume that was on May 13 between the hours of 5:50 a.m. and 7:20 p.m.?
Mr. Leigh. Well, the first principal military action---.
Mr. Zablocki. But an hour later at approximately 8:30 p.m. that same evening, a
U.S. aircraft sank a Cambodian vessel seeking to approach the Mayaguez.
Mr. Leigh. That is right, sir.
Mr. Zablocki. Therefore, the orders must have been given to the area by the
President to use military force prior to the actual commencement of ---.
Mr. Leigh. Yes, the President told the Members of Congress that in that period he
had ordered the U.S. military forces to take action to prevent the seamen and the
vessel from being moved to the mainland.
Id. at 81.
49
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phone calls to the White House following the rescue mission ran
twelve to one in support of the President. 5' This recent history shows
that the risk of political injury to the President, resulting from unilateral military action is not enough to insure compliance with the
consultation clause. Thus far, the tendency to support the President's
military decisions once they are made has outweighed congressional
and public concern with section 3 violations.
Finally, there is a more intrinsic limitation to consultation under
section 3 of the War Powers Resolution. Even if the President were to
engage in consultation, there is no way for Congress to make its
opinion binding. Congress can only compel the President to engage in
the formalities of consultation; that is the physical act of calling or
meeting with congressional members to discuss situations where military intervention is being considered, before the order is given to
deploy troops. While it is possible that the President may be required
to listen, it is beyond the scope of war-powers consultation to require
that the President act accordingly. The formalities indicated above
are the most compliance that Congress might exact from an unwilling
President. While this maximum enforceable consultation does not
ensure "that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the
President" 52 will apply to war-powers decision making, it can be
meaningful if it occurs in advance.
IV. THE GAP BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE
PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE WAR POWERs RESOLUTION

Due to the enforcement problems discussed in Part III, to ensure
even the maximum enforceable consultation, section 3 of the War
Powers Resolution must be specific as to when and with whom consultation must occur. Section 3 of the Resolution lacks this specificity,
and provides the President with two means of circumventing the clear
legislative intent that prior, meaningful war-powers consultation take
place.
First, the law requires that the President consult "in every possible instance" 53 before introducing armed forces. This language, taken
from the original House version, was explained in an accompanying
report issued by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Use of the word
"every" was to reflect the committee's belief that prior consultations
should exist "in extraordinary and emergency circumstances-even

5' Newsweek, May 26, 1975 at 16.
52 War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 3, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
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when it is not possible to get formal congressional approval in the
form of a declaration of war or other specific authorization." '5 4 By
including the word "possible," Congress gave the President the opportunity to allege that prior consultation was "impossible." During a
speech delivered April 11, 1977, at the University of Kentucky, exPresident Ford enumerated seven reasons why it is impossible to in55
volve the Congress in the decision to deploy United States forces.
This list did not include the only reason given by the drafters for
including the word "possible" in the law, which was that they could
envision situations demanding such an immediate response that there
would not be time enough to consult. As a result, because section 3
includes the word "possible," even during incidents such as the Mayaguez, where there were over twenty-four hours available for consultation, the President is able to argue that such consultation is "impossible" and therefore not contemplated by section 3.
The language of section 3 provides the President with a second
opportunity for evasion. There is an apparent gap between the reporting requirements of section 4, and section 3 which states that the
President shall consult "before introducing United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances . . . ."5 In
addition to requiring that the President report in writing to Congress
after introducing troops into hostilities and imminent hostilities, section 4 requires that the President report when troops are introduced
"into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat" and where they are introduced "in numbers
which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for
combat already located in a foreign nation .... ."57 As a result, the
scope of the reporting requirement under section 4 is broader than the
consultation required under section 3. When asked about the difference between these two sections, Senator Javits stated that as a matter
of policy it was intended that the President be required to consult
prior to any troop deployment, not only when hostilities or imminent
58
hostilities are involved.
Therefore, the Resolution allows the President to evade the consultation requirement by alleging that no "hostilities" are involved.
The attempted rescue, on April 24, 1980, of the American hostages

H.R. Rep. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973).
55 War Powers Resolution: Hearings, supra note 41, at 325.
"0War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148 § 3, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
5' Id. §§ 4(a)(2), 4(a)(3).
-" War Powers: A Test of Compliance, supra note 41, at 64.
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held captive in Iran illustrates the use of this loophole. In the same
manner that President Ford bypassed the Congress in using armed
forces to recapture the Mayaguez, President Carter ignored the consultation requirements in attempting to rescue the hostages. Shortly
before the rescue mission was aborted, President Carter told Senate
Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd that a covert action was being rehearsed, he did not mention that the mission was already underway.
Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. was never contacted by
the President in advance of the rescue attempt despite enough time to
do so. 59 Two days after the failed mission, on April 26, 1980, the
President submitted a written report to the Speaker of the House and
President pro tempore of the Senate pursuant to section 4 wherein he
laid the foundation for a defense to possible allegations of noncompliance with the section 3 consultation requirements. In relevant part the
report stated:
On April 24, 1980, elements of the United States Armed Forces
under my direction commenced the positioning stage of a rescue
operation which was designed, if the subsequent stages had been
executed, to effect the rescue of the American hostages .... The
subsequent phases of the operation were not executed. Instead, for
the reasons described below, all these elements were withdrawn
from Iran and no hostilities occurred.6 0 (Emphasis added.)
President Carter's interpretation of the term "hostilities" is not
consistent with the intent of the authors of the War Powers Resolution. Taken from the original House version, the term was explained
in an accompanying report:
"[H]ostilities" was substituted for the phrase "armed conflict" during the subcommittee drafting process because it was considered to
be somewhat broader in scope. In addition to a situation in which
actual fighting has begun, "hostilities" also encompasses a state of
confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is
a clear and present danger of armed conflict. "Imminent hostilifor
ties" denotes a situation in which there is a clear potential either
6
such a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict. 1
Applying
situation
since the
conflict."

this definition, the attempted rescue in Iran was indeed a
involving "hostilities," or at least "imminent hostilities,"
mission presented a "clear and present danger of armed
Had the rescue proceeded as planned, United States Armed

5' Lanouette,

War Powers Irresolution, 12 Nat'l J. 740 (1980).
'0 126 Cong. Rec. H2991 (daily ed. April 28, 1980).
", H.R. Rep. No. 287, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 7(1973).
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Forces would almost certainly have been engaged in fighting. Despite
persuasive evidence to the contrary, President Carter maintained that
these were not "hostilities," and that no prior consultation was required. This demonstrates how an apparent drafting error,6 2 limiting
consultation to situations involving "hostilities," enables the President
to avoid section 3 consultation.
V. AMENDING THE WAR PowERs RESOLUTION

The international incidents which have triggered the consultation requirements of the War Powers Resolution demonstrate that
section 3 lacks the requisite specificity to insure even the maximum
enforceable consultation, let alone the more comprehensive consultation intended by those members of Congress who drafted and enacted
the law. To insure the maximum enforceable consultation, section 3
must be amended. The following modifications would clarify the
legislative intent, and facilitate enforcement of the consultation requirement. First, section 3 should apply to each of the three situations
where a written report is required under section 4. That is, not only to
situations involving "hostilities" or "imminent hostilities," but also
situations where the armed forces are introduced into the territory,
airspace or waters of a foreign nation, or in numbers which substantially enlarge the United States Armed Forces equipped for combat in
.a foreign nation. Second, the definition of "hostilities" included in the
report to accompany H.R.J. Res. 54263 should be incorporated into
the text of the statute. It should be clearly indicated that there can be
"hostilities" even if no shots have been fired, and that "imminent
hostilities" include even the threat that foreign troops might fire on
United States forces. Third, by deleting the word "possible," the
President should be required to consult in "every" instance before
introducing armed forces. If there are situations which Congress considers so exigent that prior consultation would be deleterious, these
should be specifically enumerated. Otherwise, the President should be
required to consult before deploying armed forces.
The principal author of the War Powers resolution, Senator
Javits, has urged that section 3 be amended to require that the President consult with the congressional committees having legislative jurisdiction, rather than the leadership which is not a unit for such
decisions.6 4 In 1977 the Carter administration endorsed a consultation methodology whereby the congressional leadership would desig62 War Powers: A Test of Compliance, supra note 41, at 85.
63 See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
" War Powers: A Test of Compliance, supra note 41, at 62.
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nate a single member of Congress to be the initial point of contact
when a crisis develops. 5 These two proposed modifications should be
integrated to require that the President consult with the chairman of
the committee having legislative jurisdiction. This fourth change
would facilitate consultation by designating an initial point of contact, and would allow the President to get the view of that legislative
committee charged with making recommendations on that subject to
the Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION

Due to the lack of specificity in section 3 of the 1973 War Powers
Resolution, either Congress or the President could have taken the
initiative and determined the nature and extent of war-powers consultation. Thus far, the President, rather than Congress, has prescribed
what little consultation there has been. Largely because of Congress'
unwillingness to assert its right to be consulted, that requirement has
been rendered a nullity. This is reminiscent of the congressional inaction that created the imbalance of war making power, between Congress and the President, which the Resolution was enacted to correct.
Then, as now, the President controlled the sphere of military intervention. Where the Constitution was ambiguous as to the allocation
of war making authority, the President, by way of his power as
Commander-in-Chief, took the initiative, thereby diminishing the
practical importance of Congress' authority to declare war. Congress'
right to war-powers consultation has been diminished by a similar
lack of initiative.
As Representative John F. Seiberling told the House Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs during oversight
hearings on the War Powers Resolution, "the mere passage of a law
does not automatically change ingrained patterns of
behavior." 66 Circumventing the consultation provisions of section 3
has become for the President a self-perpetuating habit, and for Congress a self-fulfilling expectation. Congress should begin to reverse the
pattern of executive avoidance by removing any doubt as to the nature
of the consultation requirement. Amending section 3 is the only way
to inject meaning into the consultation clause, and to insure that the
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply
to the use of United States Armed Forces.

65 War Powers Resolution: Hearings, supra note 41, at 200 (letter submitted by Douglas J.
Bennet, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations).
0 War Powers: A Test of Compliance, supra note 41, at 42.

